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distinction between a contractor and an
agent is sound in principle might well
be questioned-it was practically denied
in Bush v. Steinman, and much might be
said in favor of that decision. But

whether sound or not, it is clearly and
immovably established by authority, and
the general rule as recognised in America
follows inexorably from it.
Lucius S. LANDRETH.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Court, District of .New Hampshire.
HORNE v.- BOSTON, &c., RAILROAD CO.
A railway corporation, incorporated in several states through which it runs, is, by
a fiction of the law, for all purposes of jurisdiction, a citizen of each of the states ;

and it cannot remove a cause to the federal courts on the ground of its citizenship in
the other states.
TnE plaintiff, a citizen of New Hampshire, brought her action
in one of the courts of that state against the defendants, as a corporation duly established and having a place of business at Exeter,
in the same state, for personal injuries sustained through the fault
of the defendants, at Lawrence, in the state of Massachusetts,
setting her damages at more than $500.
The defendants in due season filed their petition, and moved to
remove the action to this court.
The judge refused to order the removal, and his ruling has been
sustained by the full bench of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
The defendants were first incorporated in New Hampshire by
their present name, and certain short lines of railroads were from
time to time constructed in Massachusetts, which together made a
continuous line of road from Boston to the state of New Hampshire, and was known as the Portland and Boston Railroad.
There was a railroad chartered in Maine under which certain
parts of what is now the road of the defendants in this state, were
built and operated. The corporations in the three states were
afterwards consolidated under substantially identical laws by which
the Boston and Maine Railroad was chartered in Maine and Massachusetts as it already had been in New Hampshire. The interests
of the stockholders were united upon equitable conditions agreed
upon by them, while each state required certain things to be done
annually by the corporation which it had chartered.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
LOWELL, J.-,The Supreme Court has decided that when the
same corporation owning a road which runs through several states,
is chartered by each of them, it is, by a useful fiction, to be considered for the purposes of jurisdiction a citizen of each of the
states: Railroad v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286. The operation of
this rule is now usually avoided by chartering the company in a
single state, and merely authorizing that identical company to do
business in other states. In such a case it remains always a citizen of the first state: Railroad Co. v. .Koontz, 104 U. S. 5;
Missouri, &c., Railroad Co. v. Texas, &c., Railroad Co., 10 Fed.
Rep. 497; Callahan v. I. & N. Railroad Co., 11 Id. 536.
If, however, there are charters in several states, the corporation
when sued in one of them as a citizen of that state cannot set up
that it is likewise a citizen of another; thus in Railroad Co. v.
Whitton, 13 Wall. 290, a corporation' chartered by Illinois and
Wisconsin was sued as a citizen of Wisconsin by a citizen of Illinois. Afterwards the plaintiff himself removed the cause to the
Circuit Court, and the defendant company moved to remand it on
the ground that it was a citizen of Illinois; but the court held
that when sued in Wisconsin as a citizen of that state, it could not
deny its citizenship there. The only difference between that
case and this is that here the plaintiff is a citizen of the state
where the action is brought; but this does not affect the argument
that the defendant company should not be permitted to deny its
citizenship in this state. So it has been held in three circuits:
C. J W. I. Railroad Co. v. L. S. &' Ht. S. Railroad Co., 5 Fed.
Rep. 19 ; Uphoff v. Chicago, &c., Railroad Co., 5 Id. 545 (and
see the very able opinion of .Judge HAmMOND in that case) Johnson v. Phila., &c., Railroad Co., 9 Id. 6.
The case of Chicago, &Jc., Railroad Co. v. Chicago, &c., Railroad
Co., 6 Biss. C. C. 219, is distinguished by Judge DRUmmoND, who
'decided both cases in 5 Fed. Rep. 19, 545, aupra, and his remarks
will apply to Nashua, &c., Railroad Co. v. Boston, ft., Railroad
Co.,. 8 Fed. Rep. 458 ; see also Johnson v. Phila., &c., Railroad
Co., 9 Id: 6.
This being the state of the authorities I will only add that the
fiction which makes two or three corporations out of what is in
fact one, is established for the purpose of giving each state its
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legitimate control over the charters which it grants, and that the
acts and neglects of the corporation are done by it as a whole.
It is not material in considering the question of jurisdiction
that the damage complained of was suffered within the limits of
Massachusetts, and that the judgment will bind the corporation in
that state: Uphoff v. Ckicaeqo, &c., Railroad Co., 5 Fed. Rep.
545.
Motion to remand granted.
The general rule made in this case was
that a corporation incorporated by each
of several states is a citizen of each
state for the purposes of jurisdiction in
the federal courts, but if incorporated in
one state and merely authorized to do
business by another state within its territory, it is not a citizen of such state,
and this for the reason that each state
has control over the corporations it brinngs
into existence.
Whilst it has been asserted (Dillon
Rem. Ca. 68) that "after much uncertainty and fluctuation of opinion in the
Supreme Court of the United States, the
settled rule now is that a corporation for
all purposes of federal jurisdiction is
conclusively considered as if it were a
citizen of the state which created it, and
no averment or proof as to citizenship
of its members is competent or material"
yet the application of the rule and the
reasons for its existence are not yet settled.
Beginning with the case of Bingham
v. Cabot, 3 Dallas 382, and running
through the cases of Turner v. ne Bank
of North America, 4 Dallas 8 ; T ner's
Adm'r. v. Enrille, Id. 7; Mossman v.
Higginson, Id. 12 ; Abercrombie v. Dupuis I Cranch 343; Waod v. Wagnon,
2 Id. I ; Capron v. Van Noorden, Id.
126 ; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Id. 267 ;
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Id.
61 ; Hodgson v. Bowerbunk. Id. 303 ;
Corporation of New Orleansv. Winter, 1
Wheat. 91 ; Sullivan v. Fulton Steamboat Co., 6 Id. 450; it was ruled and
reiterated that in order to maintain an
action in the United States courts the

parties must be citizens (men-material,
social, moral and sentient beings-not
corporations) of different states, and
must be so averred and appear on the
record -not inferred-and the cause must
have existed ab orgine between citizens
of different states. See Montalet v.
Murrayi 4 Cranch 46 ; Gibson v. Chew,
16 Pet. 315 ; Course v. Stead, 4 Dallas
22; Tackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148;
Methodist Church Case, 4 Wash. C. C.
595.
In 1809 the question arose in three
cases: Bank of United States v. Deveux,
5 Cranch 61 ; Wood v. Insurance Co.,
Id. 57 ; Insurance Co. v. Boardnan, Id.
78. Chief Justice M sARSHAi
said "that
the invisible, intangible, and artificial
beini, the mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen,
and cannot sue or be sued in the courts
of the United States, unless the rights
of the members in this respect can be
exercised in the corporate name," and
as 14the right of a corporation to litigate
depends upon the character of the members who compose it, a body corporate is
not a citizen," hence judgment in the
last case was reversed because the record
did not show the citizenship of the cor-"
porators. This ruling was followed in
Sullivan v. 1uldton Steamboat Co., 6
Wheat. 450, and Brethaupt v. The Bank
of Georgia, I Pet. 238. In Vicksburg
Bankv. Socomb, 14 Pet. 60, the corporation was sued in the state of its charter by
a citizen of a different state ; but it appearing by plea that two of its corporators were
citizens of the same state as the plaintiff,
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the court declined jurisdiction, affirming
the Circuit Court~decisions in 4 Wash.
C. C. 597; Bank v. Willis, 3 Sumn.
472; Ward v. Arrendondo, 1 Paine 410.
This was followed in Irvine v. Lowrie,
14 Pet. 293.
In the Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
the court held that "a corporation is not
a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and cannot maintain a suit in the United States
courts against citizens of a different state
from that by which it was chartered unless the persons who compose the corporate body are all citizens of that
state." In harmony with this the court
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.
519, stated that "a corporation has no
legal existence out of the state which
created it because it exists only in contemplation of law and by force of the
law, and where that law ceases to operate
the corporation can have no existence.
A corporation must dwell in the place
of its creation." See Runyan's Case,
14 Pet. 122, Federalist, No. 80. Up to
this period it was certainly the doctrine
that a corporation was not a citizen
within the constitution or judiciary act
and had no recognition in the federal
courts, and this existed until 1844, when
arose the case of The Louisville, Cincinnati a d Charleston Railroad Co. v. Let'son, 2 How. 497.
In that case a citizen of-New York sued
a South Carolina corporation in South
Carolina, describing its corporators as
citizens of South Carolina, and it appearing by plea that two of the corporators
were citizens of North Carolina, the
court noticed this point as being new,
and held that the parties were citizens of
different states, saying that the case
might be placed on this ground and thus
harmonize with the doctrines in former
cases, and proceeds: "But there is a
broader ground upon which we desire to
be understood, upon which we altogether
rest our present judgment, although it
might be maintained upon the narrower
VOL. XXXII.-14

ground already suggested. It is, that a
corporation created by and doing business
in a particular state, is to be deemed to all
intents and purposes as a person (although
an artificial person), an inhabitant of
the same state for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as
a citizen of that state as much as a
natural person." The court, however,
limited the application of this language,
stating that a corporation is deemed a
citizen because tle legal presumption is
that the members of the corporation are
citizens of the state which incorporated
it, hence the suit is presumed to be
against the members, "and no averment
or evidence to the contrary is admissible
for the purpose of withdrawing the suit
from the jurisdiction of a court of the
United States."
Here we have two distinct views:
the early cases holding that a corporation is not a citizen because it is
not a being but a legal entity, and the
court could only take jurisdiction on the
citizenship of the members (see Insurance
Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cr. 57), and the
Letson case, that a corporation is a citize*-or, which is the same thing-that
although the jurisdiction depends upon
the citizenship of the members of the
corporation, they will be conclusively
presumed to be citizens of the state
which created the corporation. Presuming upon the doctrine in Letson's case,
a corporation sought recognition in Kentucky (12 B. Mon. 212), and the court,
speaking of Letson's case, said: "There
are some expressions in that opinion
which indicate that corporations may be
regarded as citizens to all intents and
purposes. But in saying this the court
went far beyond the question before it,
and to which it may be assumed that
their attention was particularly directed." (See 3 Zab. 429).
In Rundle v. Canal Co., 14 How. 80,
one of the judges who assisted in the
Letson case expressed his disapprobation
of its doctrine, while another limited the
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conclusions of the court to the decision
of the case before it. Subsequently, in Indiana Railroadv. Michigan Railroad, 15
How. 233, this question of jurisdiction
was again presented, but the case went
off on another ground, and in Marshall's
Case, 16 How. 327, the court repudiated
the "presumption" part of the Letson
case, and said that "a corporation is a
citizen, because although it is an artificial person, and a mere legal entity
cannot be a citizen; yet it acts and contracts by and through natural persons,
and it is not reasonable that those who
deal with such persons should be deprived of a valuable privilege by a syllogism, or rather sophism, which deals
subtly with words and names without
regard to the things or persons they are
used to represent." In two subsequent
cases the court followed the ruling in
Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18
How. 404; Covington Drawbridye Co. v.
Shepherd, 20 Id. 231. Then followed the
case of Ohio andMississippiRailroad Co.
v. Wheeler, I Black 295, decided in 1861,
where the declaration stated that the
railroad company is a corporation under
the laws of Indiana and Ohio, having its
place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio,
and that Wheeler was ,acitizen of Indiana. Wheeler pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, averring that he was a
citizen of Indiana, and that the railroad
was a citizen of Indiana, and hence the
court had no jurisdiction. The railroad
demurred to the plea, and Chief Juitice
TAxEn delivered the unanimous opinion
of the court that on the facts presented
by the pleadings the United States courts
had no jurisdiction, saying that "a suit
by or against a corporation in its corporate name is a suit by or against citivens of the state which created it, hence
this suit in the corporate name is a suit
of the individual persons who compose
it, and must therefore be regarded and
treated as a suit in which citizens of
Ohio and Indiana are joined as plaintiffs in an action against a citizen of In-

diana. Such a suit cannot be maintained on the ground of citizenship, and
it makes no difference whether suit is
brought in the individual names of the
corporators or the corporate name. This
corporation has been chartered by Indiana and Ohio, clothed with the same
capacities and powers, and intended to
accomplish the same objects. It has no
legal existence in either state except by
the law of that state. Neither state
could confer on it a corporate existence
in the other state nor add to or diminish
the powers to be there exercised., It
may be composed of the same natural
persons, but the legal entity or person
which exists by force of law can have no
existence beyond the limits of the state
which brings it into life and endues it
with its faculties and powers. The
president and directors of the Ohio and
Mississippi Railroad Co. are therefore a
distinct and separate body in Indiana
from the corporate body of the same
name in Ohio, and they cannot be joined
in a suit as one and the same plaintiff,
nor maintain 'a suit in that character
against a citizen of Ohio or Indiana in a
United States court." As this case has
been since followed it should be notited.
It decides: (1) A corporation has no
existence outside of the state which
created it. This is in harmony with the
prior cases. (2) A corporatiofi incorporated by two states with the same
name, capacities and powers, and intended to accomplish the same objects,
and spoken of in the laws of both states
as one corporate body with same name
and powers, is a separate and distinct
corporation in each state. This is a
logical sequence from the first proposition, and accords with the early cases
heretofore cited ; but what.constitutes an
act of incorporation, or a license, or a
permit, is not settled. Railroadv. Harris,
12 Wall. 65; Railroad v. Alabana,
107 U. S. 581. (3) The members of
a corporation are presumed to be citi.
zeus of the state which created it, and a
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mitting it to a jury, that all the conductors and agents were habitually violating
the orders of their masters, as well as
an act of the legislature ? It is for the
jury to say what is the natural presumption w hich arises oat of such facts, and
there is no rule of policy which requires
us to make any legal or fictitious presumption on the subject. I wlll not say
what verdict ought to be given on such
evidence, but I am very clear, that no
man who is not a juror in the case has
the right to decide that the president
and directors were ignorant and therefore innocent of a custom which was
open, public and notorious :" Commonwealth v. Ohio, 4-c., Railroad Co., I
Grant Cas. 350.
Aside from the implication from
usage of authority in the officer or agent
to make the contract in question, a
strong reason for holding the company
liable in these cases is that it had received the consideration and benefit of
the contract, and hence should not be
permitted to repudiate it, and thus take
advantage of its own wrong. In Burgate v. Shortridge, supra, Lord ST.
LEoNA.nus said: "It does not appear
to me that if by a course of action the
directors of a company neglect precautions which they ought to attend to,
and thereby lead third persons to deal
together as upon real transactions, and
to embark money or credit in a concern
of this sort, these directors cannot, after
five or six years have elapsed, turn
round, and themselves raise the objection that they have not taken these
precautions, and that the shareholders
ought to have inquired and ascertained
the matter. * * * The way, therefore,
in which I propose to.put it to your
lordships in point of law is this: The
question is not whether that irregularity
can be considered as unimportant or as
being different in equity from what it
is in law, but the question simply is,
whether, by that continued course of
dealing, the directors have not bound

themselves to such an extent that they
cannot be heard in a court bf justice to
set up, with a view to defeat the rights
of the parties with whom they have
been dealing, that particular clause enjoining them to do an act which they
themselves have neglected to do."
Acceptance and enjoyment of the
benefits accruing from the act or contract of its officers or agents, even
though such act or contract be clearly
ultra vires and outside of the charter
powers of the company, will estop the
company from repudiating such act or
contract, and disclaiming responsibility
for it : Zabriskie v. Cleveland, 6-c., Railroad Co., 23 How. 381 ; Bissell v. H.
S., 4-c., Railroad Co., 22 N. Y. 258;
Parish v. Wheeler, Id. 494 ; Cary v.
Cleveland, 6-c., Railroad Co., 29 Barb.
35 ; De Groffv. American, 6-c., Co., 21
N. Y. 124; Argenti v. San Francisco,
16 Cal. 255 ; McClure v. Manchester,
6-c., Railroad Co., 13 Gray 124; Chapman v. M. B., 6-c., Co., 6 Ohio St. 137 ;
Hale v. U. Mutual, 4-c., Co., 32 N. H.
297; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall.
413; White v. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick.
181; Tracy v. Talnage, 14 N. Y.
162; Rster v. La Rue, 15 Barb. 323;
Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla.
110; Gould v. Town of Oneonta, 3 Hun
401 ; Hazlehurst v. Savannah, 4-c., Railroad Co., 43 Ga. 54; Chicago Building
Society v. Crowell, 65 Il1. 458; Bradley
v. Ballard, 55 Id. 413; Bank v. Hamnwnd, I Rich. L. 281 ; Silver Lake Bank
v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370; Potter v.
Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill. 490 ; Suydam v.
Morris Canal, 4-c., Co., Id. 491 note;
Sackett's Harbor Bank v. Lewis Co.
Bank, 11 Barb. 213; Humphrey v.
Patrons' MercantileAssociation, 50 Iowa
607.
A fortiori, then, will acceptance and
enjoyment of the benefits accruing from
the acts or contracts of its officers or
agents estop the company from repudiating them where such acts are not ultra
vires but within the powers of the com-
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the B. & 0. Railroad Co. a corporation
of the District but upon the ground that
the act operated as a license to the company to construct its road there, and
having accepted the license, the company
had placed itself in a position of a
domestic corporation for all the purposes
at least of being sued in that locality.
The court say they could see no reason
why one state may not'make a corporation of another state as there organized
and conducted a corporation of its own
quo ad hoc any property within its territorial limits," citing Maryland v. N.
C. RailroadCo., I8 .Md. 193 ; Spraguev.
Railroad Co., 5 R. I. 233; Goshorn v.
Supervisors, I W. Va. 308; Pa. RailPa. St. 205 ; Pomeroy v.
road v. Sly, 465
Railroad Co., 4 Blatchf. 122. This position was also enunciated by the West
Virginia court in several able opinions.
B. 6- 0. Railroad Co. v. P., W. 6- Ky.
Railroad, 17 W. Va. 867; Henen v. B.
4- 0. R. R. Co., Id. 895 ; Kephart v.
Ma/zony, 15 Id. 609; Hall v. Bank oJ
Va., 14 Id. 618 ; B. J" 0. RailroadCo.
v. Supervisors, 3 Id. 319. But this
position is adverse to B. 4- 0. Railroad
Ce. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5; B. 4- 0.
Railroad v. Carey, 28 0. St. 208; Railroad v. &ringer, 32 14. 468; Brownell
v. Railroad, 3 Fed. Rep. 761 ; Calahan
v. Railroad, 11 Id. 536; Mo. Railroad
v. Texas Railroad, 10 Id. 497 ; 0hicago
Railroad v. L., S. - M. Railroad, 1
Reporter 323.
In Railroad v. Koontz, supra, the
question involved was whether by taking
a lease of the road of a Virginia corporation, the Maryland corporation made
itself Also a corporation of Virginia for
all purposes connected with the use of
the leased property? The Maryland
corporation leased the railroad and
franchise of a Virginia corporation.
Neither state legislature acted in the
matter. "The Maryland corporation
simply occupies the position of a company carrying on an authorized business
away from its home, with the consent of

its own state and that of the state in
which its business is done, and, theref6re, it was entitled to removal, because
the company, by leasing the Virginia
road, did not become a citizen of Virginia. Its charter is the law of its
existence and the locus of its legal
residence, and it did not change its
citizenship, it simply extended the field
of its operations. 'It resides in Maryland, but does business in Virginia. A
corporation is a citizen of the state which
created it. It cannot migrate or change
its residence without the consent of its
state."
It is, perhaps, questionable
whether this case is in harmony with the
reasoning in prior cases In Railroad
Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, the
legislature of Alabama passed an act entitled "'an act to incorporate The Memphis and Charleston Railroad," the preamble stating "whereas an act was
passed by the state of Tennessee for the
formation" of the company aforesaid,
and, therefore, it was enacted that "said
company shall have the right of way and
enjoy the rights, powers and privileges
granted by the Tennessee act of incorporation and subject to the same liabilities and restrictions imposed by said act."
Then follows same special requirements,
and the court held that this was an act
incorporating this company in Alabama,
and, although also incorporated in Tennessee, it must, -asto all its doings in Alabama, be considered a citizen of Alabama.
This act is substantially the same as
the irginia act concerning the B. & 0.
Railroad, and thecourt did not compare or
refer to that enactment. In The Railroaa
Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 283, the court
stated that "* although a corporation is an
artificial person, created by legislative
power, it is not a citizen within several
provisions of the constitution, yet where
rights of action are to he enforced it is a
citizen of the state where it was created
within the clause extending the judicial
power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different states.
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This company being, therefore, incorporated by Illinois, Wiscopsin and Michigan must be regarded a citizen of each
of these states." In Mulerv. Dows, 94
U. S.444, a corporation created by the
laws of Iowa was consolidated with a corporation of the same name in Missouri,
under theauthorityofeachstate ; the court
held that it was a citizen of each state,
and stated that a corporation could
sue and be sued, but that the suit was
regarded as a suit by or against the
stockholders, who were conclusively
presumed to be citizens of the state
which - created it. And in Steamship
Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, the
court said that a corporation is a citizen
of the state which incorporated it, because the individual members of it are
conclusively presumed to be citizens of
the state which created the corporation,
stating that in this it followed Wheder's
case, Lson case, Marshall's case, Shepherd's case; insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5
WalL 541 ; Plaul v. Virginia, 8 Id. 177 ;
.RailroadCo. v. Harris, 12 Id. 65. See
Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5;
Railroad Co. v. MississippiM, 102 Id. 135 ;
Kern,. Huidekoper, 103 Id. 485 ; Inaure co-Pany v. Dunn, 19 Wallace
214.
Although it has been asserted in
several cases, since the Letson case
and the Marshall case, that it is
now settled that a corporation is a
citizen of the state which created it, and
can sue in its corporate name, for the
reason that the persons who compose it
will be conclusively considered citizens
of such state--equivalent to saying that
a corporation is a citzen-yet the reasons
do not harmonize nor when compared
produce the same conclusionsi, and if the
conclusions are correct, there seems to be
no reason why a corporation is not a
citizen within the meaning of some of
the amehdments to the constitution.
A corporation is or is not a citizen.
If it is, it can sue. If it is not, it cannot sue. Before the Letson case the

courts held that a corporation was not a
citizen, but that the individuals who composed it could sue and be sued in the
United States courts. Since that case it
has been held that a corporation can sue
in its corporate name, because the individuals who compose it will he held to be
citizens. Before and since that case the
suit is really and in fact by and against
the individuals-the natural persons-but since that case it is presumed that
the suit in the name of the artificial
person is a suit by and on behalf of the
natural persons, hence a corporation
is held to be a citizen and can sue.
If a citizen, it is a citizen of the state
which created it, and as a state-a sovereignty---can create a legal entity--a
corporation-in any manner it pleases;
a corporation can be created by one or
more states ; and a state can incorporate
the corporation of another state, even if
composed of the same natural persons. If
the corporation is chartered-incorporated-it is a legal being-a citizen--of
such state. If not chartered, but operating under an enabling act-a license, a
permission, or a lease, or anything
which does not amount to an at of
incorporation-it is not a citizen of
such state, because it is not by that state
created a legal person or being. But
when is a legislative enactment a charter
or an enabling act, or a license ? What
distinctive elements, features or language
distinguish one from the other?
The same enactment substantially was
held in the Harriscase to be a license
or enabling act, and not a charter, and
in the Alabama case, 107 U. S. 581, to
be a charter. In Marshall's case,
Wheeler's case, Whitton's case, Muller
v. Maryland; &ate v. Railroad, 18 Md.
193; Allegheny Co. v. Railroad, 51 Pa.
St. 228, and the Va. and West Va. Cases,
the courts held the respective enactments
to be charters, whilst the other cases held
such acts were not charters. This question has not been settled. See'Morse v.
Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 445; Doyle
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v. Insurance Co., 4 Otto 535 ; Ezparte
Schollenberger, 6 Id. 369.
Intimately connected with this is the
question whether or not a state court can
inquire into the facts and judicially determine whether or not the case is removable
from the state to the federal court and
either grant or deny the application.
The following cases assert that the state
court has not the power: Stewart 6- Cutts
v. Mordecai, 40 Ga. 1 ; St. Anthon
Falls, W. P. C. v. King Bridge Co., 23
Minn. 186 ; Harryfordv. .-Etna Ins. Co.,
42 Mo. 148; Hatch v. Railroad Co., 9
Blatchf. 105; _Ask v. Railroad Co., Id.
362; 27rsk v. Union Pac. Railroad Co.,
8 Id. 243; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dillon
242; Cobb v. Insurance Co., 3 Hughes
452. The following cases assert that
the state court has this power: Mahowne v.
Railroad Co., 111 Mass. 72; Bryant T.
Rich, 106 Id. 10; DuVivier v. Hopkins, 116 Id. 125; Insurance Co. v. Garbach, 70.Pa. St. 150; Hadley v. Dunlap,
10 0. St. 1 ; Whitton v. Railroad Co., 25
Wis. 424; Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Id. 165;
The People ex rd. West'n Tran. Co. v.
Sup. C., 34 Ill. 356 ; Darst v. Bates, 5
Id. 439; Del. Railroad Const. Co. v.
Railroad Co., 46 Iowa 406; Burch v.
Dayv. 4- St. P. Railroad,Id. 452 ; Crane
v. Reeder, 28 Mich. 527; Mabley v.
Judge Sup. Ct., 41 Id. 33; Atlas Ans.
Co. v. Bprus, 45 Ind. 133 ; Mc Wkinney
v. Brinker, 64 Id. 360 ; blair v. W. P.
Mfg. Co., 7 Nab. 146 ; Orosaco v. Gagliardo,22 Cal. 83; Clarke v. Opdyke, 10
Hun 383; Carswell v. Schley, 59 Ga.
19 ; State ex rel. Coons v. Judge, itc., 23
La. Ann. 29; Hanen v. B. 4- 0. Railroad, 17 W. Va. 881; P., W. 4- Ky.
Railroadv. B. 4- 0. Railroad, Id. 812 ;
Tunstall v. Parish of Madison, 30 La.
Ann. 471:
Under the act of 1875 a case cannot
be removed unless the petition is filed
"at or before the term of the state
court at which the case could be first
tried and before the trial "-not at the
first term, but at the first term at which

the cause as a cause could be tried.
Under the act of 1789, sec. 12, stat. 79,
the application for removal must-have
been made by the defendant when he
entered his appearance. Under acts
1866, ch. 288, 14 stat. 306, and act
18.67, ch. 196, 14 stat. 558, it might be
made at any time before trial. This was
the condition when the act of 1875 was
passed, and the language of that act
shows clearly a determination on the
part of congress to changematerially the
time within which applications for removal
were to be made. It was more liberal
than the act of 1789, but not so much so
ai 'the later statutes. Under the acts
of 1866-67 it was sufficient to move at
any time before actual trial, while under
the .act of 1875 the election must be
iade at the first term in which the cause
is in law triable. Babbitt v. Clark, 103
U. S. 606.
In DuPivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass.
125, the court affirmed the order of the
Superior Court refusing the petition for
removal. In Mahione v. Railroad Co.,
111 Mass. 72, the court stated that to
remove a cause the requirements of the
act of congress must be complied with.
If they are not, the jurisdiction of the
federal court does not attach, and whether
the requirements have or have not been
complied with is for the state court to
determine. The case of The People ex
rel. West'n Trans. Co. v. The Superior
Court, 34 Ill. 356, was an application
for mandamus to compel the court to remove, which was refused, and the court,
in affirming the order of refusal, said:
"At the hearing of the petition, the petitioner should adduce satisfactory evidence of the facts which the act of congress requires to have existed to entitle
him to a removal of the cause. If there
is no satisfactory evidence offered of
such facts, it is the duty of the court to
refuse the prayer of the petition." In
Burch v. Daenport v. St. Paul Railroad
Co., 46 Iowa 452, the court held that if
the suit is not in fact removable, it is the
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duty of the state court to disregard the
application. Th6 petition presents a
question of law for the determination of
the state court, and the mere filing of
the petition and record in the federal
court does not ipsofacto remove the case.
Nor will the filing of the petition and
surety in the state court divest the state
court of further jurisdiction, because
"the court must be satisfied by proper
evidence that the facts are sufficient to
authorize the removal, and for this purpose the court has a right to inquire into
the facts set forth in the petition, as well
as investigate the sufficiency of the surety
and determine the matter accordingly."
Orosaco v. Gagliardo, 22 Cal. 83.
The act of 1875 does not prescribe
what the petition shall contain, but provides that when certain facts specified in
the act exist, a petition may be made and
filed for the removal of the suit. The
existence of these facts must be ascertained by the court to which the application is made, and to that end the averments of the petition may be controverted
by the opposite party. Under the act of
1789, which was like that of 1875 in this
particular, affidavits or other proofs were
frequently received to eontovert the petition. Clark v. 0pdyke, 10 Hun 383 ;
Anderson v. Manufacturers' Bank, 14
Abb. Pr. N. S. 436; 4kv.icago, Rock
Island 4-Pac. Railroad,3 Abb. Pr. N. S.
453; Smithy. Butler, 38 How. Pr. 192 ;
N. Y. Piano Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 357. When the
state court, wherein a suit is pending, is
called on to yield its jurisdiction on
statutory grounds, it must inspect the
documents, and evidence to ascertain
whether or not these statutory grounds
exist. How else could the court know
whether to retain or part with the causef
The state court must decide whether a
given case is or is not a part of its business. The proceeding for removal is
open, by petition, and contemplates a
taking with leave, and not furtively by a
sort of statutory larceny.
The state

court must know of the proceedings and
see that the facts come within the requirements of the act. When they conform
thereto the state court has no right or
power to retain the case, and when they
fail in any essential particular, it has no
right or power to send the case away or
order it removed.
Carswell v. Schley,
59 Ga. 19. And the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Gordon v. Longest,
16 Pet. 97, held the same views substantially, and stated that "it must be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the
state court" that the case is removable.
In Kanouse v. Marfin, 15 How. 198, the
court said that when it appeared to the
state court that the sum, citizenship and
sufficiency of the surety were within the
act, a case for removal was made, and it
was "then the duty of the state court to
accept the surety and proceed no further
in the cause." In Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 20 Wall. 458, Chief Justice
WAITE, with whom concurred Mr. Justice DAvis, said "the state court bad
jurisdiction to try the question of citizenship upon the application for removal."
.After conceding the power of the state
court to determine whether or not a case
is removable, the Supreme Court, in
Kimball v. Evans, 93 U. S. 320, said
that "after final judgment has in fact
been rendered by the highest court of the
state in which a decision in the suit can
be had, the case may be again brought
here for a determination of the question
arising upon the petition for removal."
But to the refusal of the state court to
order the removal, the record must show
an exception to the ruling in order to
have a standing in the federal Supreme
Court upon a writ of error. Fashnachtv.
Brank, 23 Wall. 416, as held in Railroad
Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 : "If, after
a case has been made, the state court
forces the petitioner to a trial and judgment, and the highest court of the state
sustains the judgment, he is entitled to a
writ of error to this court if he saves the
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question on the record. And if the exception is saved on the record, it is not
necessary to protest to the exercise of
jurisdiction at subsequent stages of the
trial. National Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118.
The state court having acquired jurisdiction it must proceed until it is
judicially informed that its jurisdiction
over the cause has ceased or is suspended. It takes the case as made by
the party himself, and need not inquire
further, but it may. If that is not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction, the state
court can proceed with the cause:
Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S.
183; Amory v. Amory, Id. 186;
because the right of removal is statutory. Before a party can remove he
must show upon the record that his
case comes within the statute. His
petition becomes a part of the record.
It should state facts, which, taken in
connection with such as already appear,
entitle him to the removal. If he fails
in this he has not in law shown to the
court that it cannot "proceed further
with the cause :" Insurance Co. v.
Pechner, supra. In Railway Co. v.
Ramsey, 22 Wall. 328,' the court said:
"To obtain the transfer of a suit the
party desiring it must file in the state
court a petition therefor, and tender the
required security. Such petition must
state facts sufficient to entitle him to
have the transfer made. This cannot
be done without showing that the Circuit Court would have jurisdiction of
the suit when transferred.
The one
necessarily includes the other. If upon
the hearinq of the petition it is sustained
by the proqf, the state court can proceed
no further." The jurisdiction of the
federal court must appear from the
record: The Bible Society v. Grove,
101 U. S. 611. This record is made
in the state court. If it does not so
appear the federal court cannot take
jurisdiction. If the state court has no
power to investigate and pass upon the

jurisdictional facts, then this question
remains undetermined in any given
case. The jurisdictional facts must be
ascertained somewhere;
the federal
court cannot do it because that court
takes the record as it comes from the
state court, hence the facts can only be
determined by the state court: Insurance Co. v. .Pechner, supra. In the
Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 474, the
Chief Justice said : "We fully recognise the principle heretofore asserted in
many cases, that the state court is not
required to let go its- jurisdiction until a
case is made, which, upon its face,
shows that the petitioner can remove
the cause as a matter of right." To
the same effect is Babbitt v. Clark, 103
U. S. 610 ; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104
Id. 5.
The weight of the authorities is that
the state court must be judicially informed of the facts and determine them,
or at least inquire whether or not the
facts exist. If the state court cannot be
deprived of its jurisdiction until judicially infoh-ned that its jurisdiction is
suspended, then it cannot be so deprived
until it judicially ascertains the truth of
the assumed facts by which that suspension has been effected. The state court
cannot judicially know that the jurisdictional averments of the petition are
true without a judicial inquiry, and it
cannot make such inquiry unless it has
the power to controvert the averments
alleged. The state court had the rightful jurisdiction of the cause before the
filing of the petition, and unless the
averments of the petition are true, its
jurisdiction continues, because a mere
fiction or falsehood cannot transfer its
jurisdiction.
Then must the court
which has the rightful jurisdiction, upon
a mere suggestion of facts, which may
be true or false, surrender its jurisdiction to a court which can have jurisdiction only in the event that the facts
are true? If this is correct then this
absurdity follows: the court which has
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jurisdiction must decline to exercise it
until a court which may have none may
see proper to decline'it. Such a construction of the statutes is not only
unreasonable, but is in conflict with the
most elementary principles of constitutional government.
In White v. Holt, Judge, et al., 20
W. Va. 814, the C. & 0. Railroad,
being defendant in the court below,
made an application in the state court
for removal, which was denied; it then
obtained a continuance and procured
transcript of the record, and docketed
the case in the ibderal court. At the
next term of the state court the order
of the federal court docketing the case
was presented, and the court refused
"to proceed further in the case." In
the federal court, whilst proceedings for
mandamus were pending in the state
court, a nonsuit was procured, and then
an injunction from the federal court to
restrain the mandamus proceedings in
the state courts. Chief Justice JonNsoN,
in an able and exhaustive opinion, said :
"The filing of the transcript and the
docketing of the case in the federal court
after the filing of the petition and bond,
did not and could not remove the case.
When the state Circuit Court refused
the petition of the defendant, the proper
course for it to have pursued was to
submit to the refusal, proceed with the
trial, and in case of an adverse judgment take an appeal to this court, and
if the judgment of the court below had
been affirmed, obtain a writ of error
from the Supreme Court of the United
States, which alone can finally decide
the question."
This method was pursued until Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13
Wall. 270, decided in 1871. Since
then there are several instances where
federal courts have assumed jurisdiction
upon the filing of the transcript and
docketing of the cases, from whence
they went to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Amongst which are the
VOL. XXXII.-15

.Renoral Cases, 100 U. S. 427 ; and
Bondurant v. 111atson, 103 Id. 281.
In 1864, Judge DRuMMsoND, in
Hougqh v. Trans. Co., 1 Biss. 425,
said: "The acts of Congress have
given certain legal discretion to the
judge of the state court, not that
thereby the defendant is deprived of
the right which the statute gives him,
but that it is competent for the appellate state court to redress the wrong if
wrong has been done to the defendant,
by correcting the errors of the court
below. If the highest state court will
not do that, the defendant has his
remedy by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. All
cases in which the question has arisen
have gone to the Supreme Court of the
United States in this way, and the error
of the state court, where any existed,
has been rectified in this way.2 See
Hdley v. Dunlap, 10 0. St. 1.
This course would preserve the harmony of our dual system of government,
and prevent the unhappy conflicts of
jurisdiction which are so frequent today between state and federal courts.
This brings up the question whether
or not the order granting or refusing
the removal is appealable. The negative was announced in Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 104. In Akert v. Vrilas,
24 Wis. 165, the court held that such
an order was appealable, and the state
courts had jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal. Judge PAINE,
who delivered the opinion, said, that
"nothing is better settled than that an
order by which a subordinate court dismisses a case for want of jurisdiction,
or in tiny way divests itself of juris,
diction, is subject to review on appeal.'"
In the Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247,
the court held that the power to heaLand determine an appeal from an order
by which a subordinate court attempts
to assume or divest itself of jurisdiction,
is not an assertion of jurisdiction. lI.
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Pelson v. Leland et al., 22 How. 48,
the court said : " The question of jurisdiction in the lower court is a proper
one for appeal," and the determination
of this question is not the exercise ot'jurisdiction on the merits. In Kanouse v.
Martin, 15 How. 198, the state Court
of Common Pleas denied the application for removal, tried the case and
rendered judgment. Appealed to Superior Court and judgment affirmed.
Supreme Court United States reversed
the judgment on the ground that the
case was removable, but conceded the
power of the Superior Court to determine the appeal: Strander v. W. Va.,
.0 Otto 303. In State ex. ref. Coons v.
The Judges lath Jud. Dist., 23 La. Ann.
29, the court said that the application for
removal is analogous to a plea to the
jurisdiction, and when granted, the
order is appealable. This was followed
in Rosenfield v. The Adams Ex. Co., 21
La. Ann. 233 ; Beebe v. Armstrong, 11
Mart. 440 ; Duncan v. Hampton, 12 Id.
92; State Bank v. Morgan, 4 N. S.
344 ; Fritz'sSyndic v. Hayden, Id. 653 ;
lsk v. .2lsk, Id. 676. In Burson v. The
Park National Bank of New York, 40
Ind. 173, 13 Am. Rep. 285, the court
held that the order of removal was
appealable. Judge DowNEY, in delivering the opinion, held that when the
order had been granted orrefused, it was
the duty of the court, on appeal, to

decide the correctness of the ruling,
and that if erroneous, it should be
reversed, but that if correct, the case
should be remanded with instructions.
That when the order was refused the
cause remained pending, and it was not
then a final order or judgment: oiting
Skeen v. Huntington, 25 Ind. 510.
The court further said "It is true
that the act of congress provides that
when the application has been made in
the proper manner for the removal, the
state court shall proceed no further in
the cause. But this does not settle the
question. The question is not, shall the
snbordinate state court proceed no further ? but may the party who has thus
been prevented from having the cause
tried in the court in which the suit was
pending, appeal to this court. If he
cannot, when and to whom is he to look
for a correction of the most flagrant
errors and abuses resulting from the
action of the subordinate court." The
court overrules The City of Aurora v.
West, 25 Ind. 148, and cites Akerly v.
Vilas, 24 Wis. 165; s.c.1 Am. Rep. 166;
Whitton v. Railroad Co., 25 Id. 424 ;
3 Id. 101 ; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 20
0. St. 175 ; 5 Am. Rep. 642 ; Kanouse
v. Martin, 15 How. (U. S.) 198;
Beery v. Irick, 22 Gratt. 484.
Jom F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.

Sutpreme Court of Minnesota.
OLSON v. CROSSMAN.
An innkeeper is by the common law responsible for the loss in his inn of the
goods of a traveller who is his guest, except when the loss arises from the negligence
of the guest, the act of God or of the public enemy. To absolve the innkeeper from
liability when the loss has been proved, it must affirmatively appear that the loss
arose from one of the above-mentioned exceptions.
A guest is not to be charged with negligence merely because the theft was com-
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mitted by another guest of the inn whom he did not bring there, even though with
his consent he is placed to sleep in the same room with such other guest.
Notice to the guest to deposit valuables with the landlord, where not such as the
statute prescribes, does not relieve the landlord from liability, unless it be brought
to the knowledge of the guest, so that his assent to limiting the liability of the landlord may be presumed.
APPEAL from an order of the Minneapolis Municipal Court,
denying a new trial.

Robinson & Bartleson, for respondent.
ferrick &'Merrick, for appellant.
GILFILLAN, 0. J.-Action by a guest against an innkeeper to
recover for money stolen from plaintiff in the inn while such guest.
The common-law .liability of an innkeeper is well stated in Lusk v.
Belote, 22 Minn. 468, thus: "An innkeeper is by the common
law responsible for the loss in his inn of the goods of a traveller
who is his guest, except when the loss arises from the negligence
of the guest, or the act of God, or of the public enemy." Unless
it appear to have arisen from an excepted cause, when the loss is
proved, the innkeeper is liable. There was no pretence in this
case that the loss was from the act of God or of the public enemy.
The only claim that it was from plaintiff's negligence was based
on the fact that the money might have been taken by one or other
of two companions with whom plaintiff came to the inn, and with
whom be occupied a room. The court correctly charged the jury
that if taken by one of these the defendant would not be liable;
but that to absolve him on that ground the fact that it was so taken
must affirmatively appear.
While a theft from the guest by a companion whom he brings
to the inn is imputable to the guest as his own negligence, he is
not to be charged with negligence merely because the theft was
committed by another guest of the inn whom he does not bring
there, even though with his consent he is placed to sleep in the
same room with such other guest.
The statute (sections 21 and 22, c. 124, Gen. St. 1878) enables
an innkeeper-to limit his liability as to certain property of a guest
by keeping an iron safe and posting certain notices. The evidence.
does not indicate that defendant had complied with this. A notice
at the head of the register of guests, or a verbal notice to the
guest, not being such notice as the statute prescribes, is of no
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avail unless the guest consent to it, so as to constitute a contract
limiting the innkeeper's liability. Of course it would not amount
to such a contract unless the guest's attention was called to it, so
that he might be presumed to have understood and assented to it.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Order affirmed.
The rule is generally stated by courts
and text writers, as stated in the prinvipal case, that where the guest is not in
fiult the innkeeper is responsible as
insurer of the personal effects of his
guest, except only against losses by the
act of God or of the public enemy:
Cooley on Torts 635 ; 2 Kent Corn.
594; 1 Chitty on Cont. (11th Am. ed.)
675; 1 Pars. on Cont. (6th ed.) 146;
Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280;
Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478 ; -Norcross
v. Norcross, 53 Id. 163; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282 ; Grinnell v. Cook,
3 Hill. 485 ; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y.
571"; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 Id. 172;
Tickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 535;
Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. 746;
Mateer v. Brown, I Cal. 221 ; Burrows
v. Trieber, 21 Md. 320 ; Sibley v.
Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553; TVoodworth v.
Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156; Packard
craf,
forth2 Met. (Ky.) 439 ; Lusk
v. N
v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468; Chamberlain v.
Masterlon, 26 Ala. 371 ; Richmond v.
Smith, 8 B. & C. 9: Morgan v. Ravey,
6 HIurlst. & N. 277; Day v. B ther, 2
H. & C. 14; Cashill v. Wright, 6 El.
& Bl. 900; Oppenheim v. White Lion
Hotel Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 515.
There are, however, eminently respectable authorities which take a different view of the innkeeper's liability.
Mr. Story, in his work on Bailments,
sect. 472, says : "But innkeepers are
not responsible to the same extent as
common carriers. The loss of the goods
of a guest, while at an inn, will be pre-

sumptive evidence of negligence on the
part of the innkeeper or of his dcmestics : Jones on Bail. 96; Bennet v.
M1ellor, 5 Term R3.276. But he may,
if he can, repel this presumption by
showing that there has been no negligence whatever: Dawson v. Chainney, 5 Q. B. 164. [See, however, the
subsequent case of Morgan v. Ravey, 6
H. & N. 277] ; or that the loss is attributable to the personal negligence of
the guest himself; or that it has been
occasioned by inevitable casualty or by
superior force."
See, also, Story on
Bail. sect. 482. Substantially the same
rule is either laid down or finds support
in the following American cases: Metcalf v. Hess,. 14 Ill. 129; Johnson v.
Richardson, 17 Id. 302; Merritt v.
Claghern, 23 Vt. 177 ; McDaniels v.
Robinson, 26 Id. 316; Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 72; lHowth v. Franklin, 20 Texas 798; Laird v. Eichold,
10 Id. 212; Howe Machine Co. v.
Pease, 49 Vt. 477 ; Sassees v. Clark,
37 Geo. 242 ; Cutler v. Bonney, 30
Mich. 259; -Vance v. Throcknmorton, 5
Bush 41.
In view of the conflict thus apparent
among the authorities, the question involved in the principal case cannot be
said to be settled, though, perhaps, it
would not be incorrect to say that the
preponderance of authority supports the
doctrine of the principal case.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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ELLA E. BEARDSLEY v. THE CITY OF HARTFORD.
A city is not bound to maintain a railing in front of the numerous basements and
basement steps that line its business streets.
As cities are, by reason of special advantages, burdened with special duties as to
highways from which country towns are exempt, so they have also the benefit of
exemptions from liability arising oat of the necessities of their business.
Open basement descents bping necessary to the business of a city, the failure of
the city to erect a barrier in front of such a basement is not of itself negligence, and
the city is not liable to a passer by who, without negligence on his part, falls into
such basement.
THIS was an action on the statute with regard to highways,
to recover damages from the defendant city for an injury sustained by the plaintiff through, as it was claimed, the defective
condition of a sidewalk of the city. The case was defaulted in the
Superior Court and heard in damages. The court awarded full
damages, and the case is brought up by a motion in error, the
defendant claiming that the court erred in awarding more than
nominal damages.
S. 0. Prentice, for appellants.
A. P. Hyde and F. -E. Hyde, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LoomIs, J.-The facts as presented by the record are briefly as follows: The place where the injury was received is a long-established
street of the city known as Farmington Avenue, at a point where a
hotel fronts upon the street, with the space between it and the street
line open and flagged like the sidewalk, with nothing to indicate
the line between the street proper and the open space in front of
the hotel. The front of the building is found to be seventeen and
a-half feet south from the curbstone of the sidewalk. The line of
the street is eleven feet south of the curbstone, leaving six and
a-half feet of space, which was private property, between the street
line and the front of the building. The hotel is kept in the second and higher stories of the building, with an entrance in front;
and all the lower story is occupied by stores fronting on the street,
the whole frontage of the building being seventy-five feet. One
of these stores, with a basement, and a stairway in front leading
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to the basement, was occupied by one Harbenstein, as a bakery.
The basement stairway extended four feet and seven inches frow
the front of the building, and had no protection except an iron
railing on the west side of it. The plaintiff, on the 12th of February 1877, had occasion to pass along the sidewalk from the east
about half-past nine in the evening, with two other-ladies, and fell
into this basement entry-way and was seriously hurt. It is found
that the night was very dark and the wind blowing with great
force, and that the three ladies went in close to the building to
protect themselves somewhat from the violence of the wind, and
that the plaintiff, when near the basement entrance, without being
aware of its vicinity or existence, turned to speak to one of the
ladies behind her and stepping backward fell into the opening. It
is also found that the accident happened without negligence or
want of care on her part.
It is well settled that a town or city is not liable for injuries
from a defect in the highway, except as made so by statute. In
some of the states a distinction is made, as to the rule of liability,
between municipal corporations, or corporations proper, and quasi
corporations, such as towns or counties, imposing a greater liability on the former. But this distinction is not made by the courts
of the New England states, and it is holaen by them that a municipal corporation is liable only by force of the statute. That is
clearly the law of this state.
Our statute provides that, "towns shall, within their respective
limits, build and repair all necessary highways and bridges, except
where such duty belongs to some particular person." Gen. St., p.
231, see. 1. Cities by their charters are charged with the same duty
with regard to the highways and bridges within their limits. And
the 10th section of the statute provides that, "any person, injured
in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge, may
recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair."
Another section of the statute provides that there shall be "a sufficient railing or fence on the side of such bridge, and of such
parts of such road as are so made or raised above the adjoining
ground as to be unsafe for travel." We think, however, that this
provision does not apply to a case like this
It has been repeatedly held in this and other states that the
absence of a railing, where the public travel is endangered by
the want of it, constitutes a defect in the highway; making the
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town or city liable, not by force of any statute specifically requiring a railing, but under the general provision that the highway shall be kept in repair-that term being held to mean that
they shall be kept in such condition as to be safe for public
travel.
A sidewalk is, of course, a part of a street, and entitled to
the same protection as the rest.
The counsel for the defendant city has argued the case as
if the mere fact that the place where the injury occurred was
outside of the limits of the highway, is sufficient to save the city
from all liability, even though the opening made travel unsafe.
This proposition cannot be sustained. An object or a state of
things outside of the line of the street may render travel unsafe,
and make i town or city liable for an injury occasioned by it. Of
course nearness to, or remoteness from, the line of the street is a
very important and generally decisive consideration in determining whether the travel is rendered unsafe by it; but where it is so
near as clearly to endanger public travel, the fact that it is outside
of the line of the street has no other effect than this: If within
the' line of the street the authorities of the town or city have
entire control over it, and can remove it if it be an obstruction, or
fill up the cavity, ifthe defect be of that character, while they
have no power to go upon private property for the purpose of
doing it. The whole power, and so. the whole duty of the corporation, is to protect the public against it by a railing. This they
have power to place, not on the property of the adjoining
owner, but only on or within the line of the street. If the adjoining owner has dug a deep hole near the street line he is personally
liable for any injury that a passenger upon the sidewalk, who uses
ordinary care, may sustain by falling into it. But the city will
also be liable, not for the digging of the hole, nor for leaving it
unfilled, but for not doing what it had perfect power to do, erecting a barricade of some sort to prevent passengers from getting
into it.

About this general principle there can be no serious question.
It is well stated by HOAR, J., in Algeo v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen
405: "The place where the plaintiff fell was indeed outside of
the line of the street ; but the defect in the street which occasioned
the injury was the want of a railing, if one was necessary at that
place to maike the street safe and convenient for travellers in the
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use of ordinary care. * * *

The true test is not whether the

dangerous place is outside of the way, or whether some small strip
of ground not included in the way must be traversed in reaching
the danger; but whether there is such a risk of a traveller, using
ordinary care in passing along the street, being thrown or'falling
into the dangerous place, that a railing is requisite to make the
way itself safe and convenient." Numerous authorities might be
cited to the same effect.
The whole question in the present case is, therefore, whether it
was the duty of the city to have placed a railing or barrier of some
kind against these basement steps, so as to make sure that no passenger on the sidewalk could stray from the public way and fall
down them.
And here it is to be observed that the city had no power to erect
a railing that should simply fence in, in front and on the sides, this
basement stairway. It would have had to go upon private ground
to do this, and that it had no right to do. It could only erect a
railing along the outer line of the sidewalk in front of the stairway.
But such a railing would not have protected passengers from getting behind it unless it was carried along the whole front. It is
found that a fence ran along the street line from the east, but only
so far as the east corner of the hotel. As the plaintiff came along
the walk from the east she must have been within the street line
until she reached the corner of the building. Harbenstein's store
was the second from the east corner, and the basement steps were
immediately east of the door of his store. The plaintiff must have
made, therefore, a very sudden deflection from the line of the sidewalk to bring herself in that short space, probably not over twenty
or at most twenty-five feet, in close proximity to the building. It is
found that the drug store at the east corner of the building had
lights in the windows, so that she must have been aware of the
deflection of her course. And her conduct in the matter is explained by the finding that she turned in towards the building " to
It is plain that, turnavoid somewhat the violence of the wind."
part
of the sidewalk that
left
the
as
she
angle,
ing in at such an
was fenced, would have brought her inside of any mere front railing that the city could have erected along the line of the walk on
its own ground.
A passenger thus turning in could be protected from falling into
the basement gangway only by side railings, which the city had no
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right to place there, or by a continuous front railing that would
have cut off all access to the hotel door and the doors of the stores,
except through gates to be opened and shut as people passed in
and out. Such an embarrassment as this to free ingress and egress
would not be tolerated in a city, in front of a hotel and stores.
And this brings us to what we think is the real question in the
case. Is a city bound to maintain a railing in front of the numerous basements and basement steps that line its business streets ?
Such basements are used in every populous city for business purposes of almost every kind. In a large city like New York the
first story of almost every business block is reached by steps, that
extend to the line of the street, while on each side of them are
steps leading down to offices in the basement. These offices are of
great value and rent for large sums, and it is essential to their convenient and profitable use that they be as open as possible to the
entry of the public. Indeed, a railing in front of them, with the
necessity of opening and shutting a gate as people passed in and
.out, would greatly impair their value for all the purposes that give
them value. The same state of things exists, though in less degree,
in a smaller city like Hartford. Along its principal streets, such
basement shops may.be counted by scores. In many of them there
is not merely the necessary depression for steps, but the excavation
extends along the whole front, giving room for larger windows and
wider entrance. Every such depression by the side of the walk,
though outside of the limits of the street, renders travel along the
sidewalk dangerous ; for even if the descent be one of but two or
-three steps, it would be enough to cause a dangerous fall to one who
should inadvertently step off. Indeed, as a person by such a fall
would be thrown against the brick'or granite sides of the building,
such a place would be much more dangerous than a pit-fall as deep
in a place in the country, where one would fall only upon the soil.
It is true that the more populous the city and hence the more
thronged the street, the greater is the number of persons exposed
to the danger; but as the city becomes more populous and the
streets more thronged, the higher become rents, and the greater
necessity for and value of such basement offices and places of business. It may indeed be set down as one of the necessities of city
life, that basements along its business and therefore its most
thronged streets, should be thus used, and that they should be not
only open but inviting to the public. Now what is the duty of
VOL. XXXIL.-16
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the city with regard to them ? There is no practicable way of perfectly protecting the public but by a railing in front of them. Can
it be regarded as the duty of a city to maintain such a railing?
Are we to apply to the case, without qualification, the same rule that
would be applied to a pit-hole, like the cellar of a burned building,
adjoining a sidewalk, where a railing would cause no inconvenience
to the owner of the property ?
It is a well-settled rule that the law varies with the varying
reasons on which it is founded. This is expressed by the maxim,
'"cessanteratione, cessat ipsa lex." This means that no law can
survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no statute to
change it; it abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests
are overborne by opposing reasons, which in the progress of society
gain a controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract
principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must
cease to apply as a controlling principle to the new circumstances.
There are certain special duties with regard to highways resting
on cities by reason of their character as such. One is that of
having a more perfect road-bed for the greater amount of travel.
Another, that of making sidewalks of ample width and generally
flagged. Still another, that of removing snow and ice from the
streets and walks. Thus, in Landolt v. City of JBorwich, 87 Conn.
618, SEYMOUR, J., says: "The peril (from snow and ice) is not
such as to warrant the great expense, in a sparsely inhabited
village, of attempting a preventive or remedy; but in cities the
aggregate of peril by reason of the number exposed to it becomes
considerable, and the means of meeting the needful expense are
ample; and hence, in cities the public as such properly undertake
the duty of doing the best they can to provide against the dangers
to travel which winter in this climate necessarily brings with it."
Now if, by reason of the special advantages and special necessities
of cities, they are by law burdened with special duties of this sort,
from which country towns and villages, by reason solely of their
character as such, are exempt, surely the rule should work favorably for cities in those particulars in which the necessities of business impose upon them limitations which do not exist in country
towns. People collect in cities in large part for purposes of traffic,
and to these purposes the central and most crowded streets of a city
are almost wholly devoted. Must not the necessities of this business furnish the law that shall determine the action of the city in
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the matter of barring out the public, for the sake of the safety of
travellers, from those places below the level of the sidewalk that
the business of the city absolutely requires should be kept easily
accessible? There are special dangers all along a city street, for
an unwary foot passenger, that do not exist in country towns. The
projecting steps against which a pedestrian can so easily stumble
in the night and be hurt, the hitching posts, posts for awnings, the
very curbstone over which he could so easily trip, with the lower
level of the gutter into which he could so easily be carried by a
misstep, the occasional necessary descent of a steep place by steps,
the projecting buttresses of buildings against which he might run
-all needing but a slight deflection from the central part of the
walk, which one would be very likely to make in a dark and
stormy night-all these things, presenting dangers rarely found in
a country village, and dangers to which the larger population
makes the aggregate of exposure much greater, a city does not
attempt, and is not expected, to provide against. They are
necessary features of a city, and the peril a necessary incident of
city life. The open basement descents are as necessary to the
business of the city as the open and unprotected wharves of a seaport are to its commerce. Some streets in the city of New York
lie close along the water, the wharves opening from them, and
necessarily kept open for the passage of drays, while their outer
edge is protected only by a low string-piece, which, while sufficient
to prevent drays from backing into the water, would be no protection to a foot passenger, but would be likely to cause him to stumble
and fall into the water. These unprotected wharves are often but a
few feet from the line of the street, and the passenger could easily
stray upon them in a dark night.
The principle we are laying down is only the old established one,
that the city must have been guilty of negligence in leaving a basement entrance unprotected, before it can be liable for an injury
happening by reason of it. If the erection of a barrier in front of
such an entrance is what the city has no right to do, or if, having
the right, it is what it cannot reasonably be expected to do, thcn
there is no negligence in the omission to do it. This principle is
abundantly sustained by the authorities.
In Tayflor v. Peckhiam, 8 R. I. 349, the court held that a town
was not liable for an injury from the fall of a sign which had not
been securely fastened in its place upon a building outside of the
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limit of the highway. BRADLEY, 0. J., in giving the opinion of
the court, says (p. 352), "The liability for such accidents would
carry with it an equally extensive authority. The towns must
necessarily have a corresponding right to control the uses of property adjoining the highway, so as to protect themselves from the
liabilities for such use." In Hubbard v. Oity of Concord, 35 N. H.
52, SAWYER, J., giving the opinion of the court, says (p. 68), "We
think it must be held to be the meaning of the enactment which
aubjects towns to liability for injuries resulting from obstructions,
insufficiencies or want of repairs in their highways, that nothing is
an obstruction which the town was not bound to have removed at
the time of the injury under the circumstances of that particular
case; nothing an insufficiency which ii was not reasonably bound
then to have improved; nothing a want of repairs which, in the
same view it was not bound to have amended. * * * If there was
no duty there was no negligence. In the very idea of negligence
is embraced a duty which the party ought to have performed. If
the town, under all the circumstances, was not bound to remedy the
defect or remove the obstruction, it is chargeable with no negligence
or failure of duty." In Jones v. Inhabitantsof Waltham, 4 Cush.
299, the defendant town was sued for an injury by falling. into a
cattle guard at a place where a railroad crossed the highway. The
town had placed a railing before it as far as it was able to do without interfering with the passage of the cars. METCALF, J., giving
the opinion of the court, says (p. 301): "The only ground upon
which the town can be held liable to this action is, that there was
a dangerous place on the roadside which required a fence or barrier
to make the road safe for travellers. But when a town has no power
to erect such fence or barrier, it is not answerable for the consequences which follow from the want of it." Clearly there can be
no difference in law between the case where a city has no power to
place a barrier, and the case where it would, in view of all the circumstances, be unreasonable and improper for it to place one.
That the negligence of the town must be actual and not merely
constructive, follows from the rule, which is well settled, that the
neglect to repair or render safe a highway must be such as would
have made the town liable to an indictment. Thus, it is said in
Davis v. City of Bangor, 42 Me. 522, that "the liability of a town
for damages arising from a defective highway depends upon proof
of the same facts that would render it liable to indictment, and in
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all cases where it may be held for damages it may be indicted."
In Wood on Nuisances, sect. 324, it is said that " as a rule, those
defects only are actionable which are indictable at common law as
nuisances ;" and further on in the same section the law on the subject of exposures to injury from objects outside of the line of the
highway is thus laid down (more strongly we think than the authorities will warrant) : "For injuries resulting from any obstruction in the highway itself, and over which the proper authorities
have lawful control, and which they can lawfully remove, the town
or city is liable. But where the injury results from something
outside the limits of the highway, upon land which they have no
authority to enter upon. the individual making or continuing the
erection or obstruction alone is liable. It would be highly inequitable to hold the town liable for injuries resulting from something
over which they have no control and which they cannot remove, any
more than any other citizen."
Now, in the court below, the judge, before whom the case was
tried upon a hearing in damages, found the fact that travel along
the sidewalk in question was endangered by the basement opening
in question, and that the plaintiff sustained the injury while in
the use of ordinary care, and upon these facts alone held the city
liable to pay full damages. We think the court was in error in
this, and that a further fact was necessary to the liability of the
defendants, namely, that the basement opening was one which the
city was bound to have protected the public against by a railing.
The law will not infer the liability from the mere fact of the danger. The law will not hold the city to the duty of erecting a barrier before such a place unless in all the circumstances it was
reasonable and proper to erect one. And this fact should appear
in the finding. There was error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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Court of Chancery of Tennessee.
IHALL

ET AL.

v. CHESAPEAKE, 01110 & S. W. RAILROAD CO.

A court of equity has no jurisdiction to compel the performance of a positive act
tending to alter the existing state of things, such as the removal of a work already
executed, although it may, by framing its order in an indirect iorm, compel a
defendant to restore things to their former condition, and thus effectuate the same
results as would be obtained by ordering a positive act to be done. The order
when thus framed is called a mandatory injunction.
The true difference between a prohibitory injunction and a mandatory injunction
is this : The former, when issued .and executed, leaves the status of things just as
it is at the time of execution. The latter, although prohibitory in form, when
issued and executed works a change in the existing condition of things by prohibiting the defendant from doing the reverse of what he is desired to do, and in this
way, he is compelled to do some act which restores the former condition of things.
A railroad company received rights of way over lands on condition that it should
establish a permanent station at H. It established a station, and permanent improvements were made by the adjoining landowners. Afterwards it removed
the station to a point three miles off, not as convenient to the general public,
and refused to stop its trains at H. On a bill filed by the landowners, alleging that
such refusal, if persisted in, would cause them irreparable damage and asking for
an injunction to restrain the railroad from running trains past H. without stopping
to give the usual facilities for receiving and delivering freight and passengers,
Held, that the injunction asked for was a mandatory injunction and would not be
granted on a preliminary application.

MOTION for preliminary injunction.

The bill was filed by certain citizens and landholders residing and
owning lands in the vicinity of Hall's Station against the Chesapeake, Ohio & S. W. Railroad Company, alleging that when the
railroad was in course of construction complainants gave to it rights
of way over their land§ upon the representation and express agreement that it had located and would establish and permanently keep
at Hall's a regular depot; that it did establish and maintain from
July 10th to October 15th 1882 such a depot; that in consideration of said agreement complainants built at their own expense a
platform and house for receiving freight and passengers, and expended a large amount of money in permanent improvements in

the vicinity; that in October 1882, the railroad established a depot at
a point three miles from Hall's, at a low swampy place, inconvenient for the public, and thereupon discontinued the use of the depot
at Hall's and refused to stop its trains there, and that complainants woult suffer irreparable injury if the company was allowed to
persist in this refusal. The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain
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the railroad company from running its trains past Hall's without
stopping to receive and deliver freight and passengers as at other
regular stations and as the convenience of the public might require;
that the railroad company should be required to stop its trains at
Hall's as aforesaid, and that it be enjoined from further interfering
with the facilities which had theretofore been accorded to complainants and the public at Hall's.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LIVINGSTON, Chancellor (after stating the facts as above).
The application for injunction was elaborately and ably argued
by the learned counsel for both parties and quite a lengthy list of
authorities has been presented for my consideration. As the case
is one of importance, I have taken time to carefully consider it,
and to look into the authorities furnished and such others as I have
at my command.
The defendant's solicitor, in his argument, resists the issuance
of the injunction asked, on the following grounds.
1st. He insists that the injunction sought is of that class denominated mandatory, and avers that the chancery practice in Tennessee, will not allow the issuance of such an injunction on mere
preliminary motion, as is sought here.
2d. That there is no merit in the application, because the court
of chancery will not take jurisdiction of the matters sought to be
litigated in the bill.
3d. Because complainant's remedy for the wrongs complained of
is by action of damages at law.
4th. That complainants are not the proper parties to enforce the
performance of a duty to the general public, in the establishing and
keeping up of a depot by the defendant.
Upon these several propositions the complainant's solicitors join
issue, and deny their soundness.
I will undertake, so far as it may seem necessary to the decision
of the matter in hand, to dispose of these propositions in the order
in which they have been presented by the defendant's solicitor.
First, as to the character of the injunction sought, and the practice of the court in reference thereto. This was the point most
discussed by counsel for both parties.
Story and Kerr define an injunction thus: " A writ of injunction may be described to be a judicial process whereby a party is
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required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ:" Story Eq.
Jur., sect. 861 ; Kerr on Inj., p. 11. The latter author says further, "When commanding an act to be done, it issues after
decree, and is in the nature of an execution to enforce the same :"
Id. Again, after classing injunctions as interlocutory and perpetual he says : " The effect and object of the interlocutory injunction is merely to preserve the property in dispute in statu quo,
until the hearing or further order :" Id. Mr. Bispham is quite
concise but very full on the same point. He says: "An injunction in its legal sense is a writ remedial, issuing by order of a
court of equity, and commanding a defendant to perform some act,
or restraining a defendant from the conmission or continuance of
some act. An injunction may, therefore, be said to be either mandatory or prohibitory : A mandatory injunction is one that compels
the defendant to restore things to their former condition, and virtually directs him to perform an act. The jurisdiction of the court
to issue such a writ has been questioned; but it is now established beyond doubt. The order, however, is not direct in its
form; but the end is reached by a writ apparently prohibitory :"
Bispham's Principles of Eq., sects. 399, 400. He then gives an
injunction to deliver books and papers, and remarks : " This order,
it will be observed, is in terms a restraining order; but in effect
it is a command to the defendant to deliver up the books and
papers :" Id. Sect. 400. Again he says: "A prohibitory injunction, as its name imports, is one which is granted for the purpose
of restraining the defendant from the continuance or commission
of some act which is injurious to the plaintiff:" Sect. 401.
These general propositions are sustained by all the elementary
authors who treat of injunctions. I make one other extract from
Kerr on Injunctions. Under the title "Mandatory Injunctions,"
he says : " Though a court of equity has no jurisdiction to compel
the performance of a positive act tending to alter the existing
state of things, such as the removal of a work already executed, it
may, by framing the order in an indirect form, compel a defendant
to restore things to their former condition, and so effectuate the
same results as would be obtained by ordering a positive act to
be done. The order when framed in such a form is called a mandatory injunction :" Id. p. 231, sect. 12.
It is quite obvious, therefore, that the real difference between a
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prohibitory and a mandatory injunction does not consist in the form
in which they are drawn. They are both prohibitory in terms.
The difference consists in the results produced when the writs ar6
executed. The prohibitory injunction, when executed, leaves the
rights of the parties and the condition of the property in the status
in which they are found when the writ is sued out. The mandatory injunction, though simply prohibitory in form, effectuates, when
executed and obeyed, a change in the status of affairs, and the defendant is compelled to do some act, by which the former condition
of things is restored. This positive result is reached "by prohibiting the defendant from doing the reverse of what he is desired
to do :" High on Inj., sect. 2.
Apply these plain rules of law to the case in hand, and what
conclusion results ? The bill alleges that the defendant, in constructing its road, established one of its depots at Hall's, and used,
accepted and treated this point as one of its regular depots, from
the time its road was opened, on July 10th 1882, to October 15th
1882, a period of three months. That during this period all the
trains, both freight and passenger, stopped daily and regularly at
this point, and that freights and passengers were received, discharged, shipped and transported by defendant at and from this
point,over and from said trains. This was the former condition
of things, prior to October 15th 1882. Since then, and at the
present time, the defendant has discontinued Hall's as a depot, or
shipping point, on its road, the trains passing without stopping,
and no freights or passengers coming to or going from Hall's over
defendant's trains, the defendant refusing to receive, discharge,
transport, deliver or forward, freights or passengers at, to or from
Hall's, as one of its depots. This is the existing condition of
affairs, and this has been the status for seven months prior to the
presentation of the bill for fiat.
Suppose an injunction to issue restraining and prohibiting the
defendant from running any of its trains, freight or passenger,
over its road by Hall's without stopping them at this point as
regularly as at the other depots on the road; and enjoining the
defendant from refusing to receive, discharge, transport, deliver and
forward freights and passengers over all its trains at, to and from
Hall's as at any other of its regular depots, and such an injunction is served, and obeyed by the defendant; will any one argue
that the result will be to maintain the present state of affairs at
VOL.
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Hall's. On the contrary, is it not clear that the effect would be
to restore the former condition of things-that existing from July
10th 1882 to October 15th 1882. It is too clear f6r discussion,
that the necessary result would be to compel defendant to re-establish and maintain a depot at Hall's. If this be so, it clearly
follows that such an injunction would belong to the class known
in the books as mandatory.
This point being settled, the next question for consideration is,
whether such an injunction will issue in our practice on preliminary motion. The question is not entirely free from difficulty.
That courts of equity will issue mandatory injunctions on final
hearing, and in execution of their decrees, is well established. Not
so, however, when the application is riade by preliminary motion,
on a bill not yet in court. Let us first look into the authorities
and rulings of the courts outside of Tennessee, to see if we may not
gather some light which will aid in the investigation in hand.
In England we find different rulings and holdings on this question. Some of the judges have asserted and exercised this jurisdiction, in extreme cases: Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Yesey 192;
Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro. C. C. 588; Beadel v. Perry,
L. R., 3 Eq. 465.
Other eminent judges have as stoutly refused and denied the jurisdiction. Anonymous case by Lord THiURLOW, 1 Vesey, Jr., 140 ;
Gale v. Abbott, 8 Jur. N. S. 987; Child v. Dougqlas, Kay 578.
Other cases, both pro and con, might be adduced, if anything was
to be gained by it. The English law writers seem to think the
jurisdiction may be exercised in extreme cases : Kerr on Inj. 232;
2 Dan. Chan. Prac. 1662-3.
The courts of the United States have been more chary than
those of England in this direction, and this extraordinary power
has been less frequently asserted and exercised. Still, a few
cases of the kind may be found in the state and federal courts.
Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Virginia, ft., Water Co., 1 Sawyer
565; Camblos v. Piladelphia Railroad Co., 4 Brewster 563.
These two references are taken from Judge COOPER's note'8 to 2
Dan. Chan. Prac. 1663, and I cannot vouch for the position claimed
for them by Judge COOPER. I would infer, however, from a synopsis of the 4 Brewster case, found in note of Mr. Prichard to the
case of Southern -Ex. Co. v. -Nashville, ft., Railway (o., 20 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 604-5, that Judge COOPER is mistaken in supposing
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that the case sustains the proposition for which he cites it in his
note. It appears from the synopsis given that the preliminary
mandatory injunction was refused, and the bill dismissed on demurrer. This was a federal court case from Pennsylvania. On
the other hand we have a number of cases-some of them ably and
well considered-which deny the jurisdiction of courts of equity
thus summarily to dispose of the rights of parties. Judge COOPER
in note 2 to Dan. Chan. Prac. 1662, says, "A mandatory injunction will not be ordered on a preliminary or interlocutory motion,
and only on final hearing to execute the decree of the court." He
cites for this proposition, Audenreid v. Railroad Co., 68 Penn. St.
370 ; HcCauley v. Kellogg, 2 Wood 13; Bogers, ft., v. Erie
Railway Co., 5 0. E. Green 379. Again he says, same note, "An
~cifinville,
injunction is no remedy for past injuries," and cites
ft. v. Huggins, 7 Cold. 217; Butherford v. Metcalf, 5 Hay. 58;
Owen v. -Ford,49 Mo. 436; 2 Stew. Eq. 6. Again, in same note,
"cAn injunction requiring a party to do a particular thing, as to
surrender possession of premises, is never allowed before final hearing," citing Kamm v. ;tark, I Sawyer 547.
I have examined the case of Audenried v. Bailroad Co., 68 Pa.
St. 370, reported also in 1 Am. Railway cases, by Truman, p. 515,
and find it an ably argued and well-reasoned case by the highest court
of Pennsylvania, that very eminent jurist, the late Judge SHARSWOOD, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court. He examines fully the Ehglish cases bearing on the question and traces all
those in favor of the summary exercise of this extraordinary
jurisdiction to the case of Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Yes. 192, which
latter case, he says, ought not to be followed in any court. He
wisely remarks, that, "an injunction as a measure of mere temporary restraint is a mighty power to be wielded by one man. It
would extend far beyond all safe and reasonable bounds to permit
it to go farther." The chancellor had granted a mandatory
injunction, following closely Lane v. Newdigate. An appeal from
the order granting the process was taken, and the court above
reversed the order of the chancellor, holding that such an injunction would never be granted before final hearing. Quite a number
lof cases from American courts are cited, and quoted from, by the
court, sustaining the views of that court.
Chancellor GREEN, of New Jersey, a.very high authority on
the jurisdiction and practice of courts of equity, arrived at a simi-
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lar conclusion, after an examination of all the authorities, in the
case of Rogers, J-c. v. Railway Co., 5 C. E. Green 387, cited in
his note 2 to Dan. Ch. 1'r. 1662, by Judge COOPER. As to the
conclusion reached by Chancellor GREEN, see Am. note to Kerr
on Inj. 2 1.
Judge REDFIELD, in his note 1 to sec. 861 of his edition of
Story's Eq. Jur., uses this language : "It seems a Court of Equity
has no power to order. a party to undo what he has done (Bradbury v. 3M'anchester, &c., Railroad Co., 8 Eng. Law and Eq. 143),
unless after a decree; in which case the injunction becomes a judicial process. Washington University v. Green, 1 Md. Ch., Dec.
97."
Thus it will be seen that the courts in this country are not in
entire accord on this question. The jurisdiction has been exercised and asserted in a few extreme cases; but in a larger number
of cases, and by abler judges, perhaps, the jurisdiction has been
denied and repudiated. I think Mr. Bispbam not very far wrong
when he says, as his conclusion of the matter, "A mandatory
injunction is granted only with great caution; and the courts are
particularly reluctant to grant such an injunction upon an interlocutory application, and before final decree. Indeedi the inclination of American courts is against granting such an interlocutory
injunction. But in England, the.better opinion is, that a mandatory injunction may be had on interlocutory application." Bisph.
Eq. Principles, sec. 400. I think he might have expressed himself in still stronger language, when referring to the "inclination"
of the American courts, as being against the practice.
Complainant's solicitors referred to and relied upon the case of
Sbuthern -Express Co. v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 20 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 590, and to the action of the other federal judges in kindred
cases, as shown by Judge BAXTER'S opinion. I find nothing in
this case, or these cases, which contravenes the view of the case which
I have just announced. 1. The practice of granting injunctions is
different in the Federal from the state court practice. 2. The orders
granted in these cases, so far as I gather from Judge BAXTER'S
opinion, were "restraining orders," which operated not as a mandatory injunction, to change the then existing state of things, but
simply to keep matters in statu quo until the hearing. The order
by Judge BAXTER granting the preliminary injunction, is given
in 2 Flippin's U. S. Rep. (6th Circuit) 688, and is clearly not for
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a mandatory injunction. 3. The question of the power of the
court to issue a Mlandatory injunction is not hinted at in the opinion, nor in the reporter's note in connection with the case. The
same considerations apply to the Nashville stockyard case from the
same court.
I have been referred, also, to the last paragraph on 724th page
of 3 Waite's Actions and Def., under title "Injunctions against
Railroads." It is sufficient to say of this reference, that there is
nothing in what the author says which indicates, in any manner,
as to how or when the injunctions referred to were granted.
The cases of Henry v. Koch, from Kentucky Court of Appeals,
22 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 394, and Corning v. Troy Iron and Nail
Factory, 40 N. Y. (1 Hand.) 191, were pressed in argument by
complainant's solicitors, as very favorable to their view of this
question. I have examined those cases, and find that the injunctions were ordered on final decree, and not before. No reference
is made, in either case, to the power of the court to grant such an
injunction on interlocutory motion.
As before indicated, I am of opinion that the practice of the
American courts is clearly against this extraordinary means of
redress. This is true of the courts outside of Tennessee. Is the
practice in our state in accord with this decided current outside of
the state ? I think so. *Ii is true we have but little in our decisions
upon the mooted question, but I think that little is all pointing
in one direction.
The first case to which I refer is that of Butherford v. Metcayf,
5 Hay. 58. I quote from the reporter's head-notes. "An injunction may issue to quiet a person in possession of land until the
hearing, if the bill shows that he is in possession, and that he is
likely to be turned out before his right can be investigated in
court." Again, "But the injunction cannot command the defendant to repair a wrong already done, but only to abstain from doing
wrong; and cannot be construed as forbidding the defendant to
keep possession of that which he actually had at the time of the
injunction."
The question before the court was whether the defendant had
been guilty of a breach of the injunction granted on motion, and
involved a discussion of the scope of the injunction. While the
direct question was not before the court in that case, yet it can be
clearly seen from the opinion in the case, as to what the judge's
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views of an injunction granted on preliminary motion were.

He

very clearly intimates, as the syllabus indicates, that the possession
could not be changed by preliminary injunction, and that the only
office to be served by an injunction was to maintain the status quo
until hearing.
I refer how to the case of McMinnville, ft., Railroad v. Huggins, 7 Cold. 218. The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain
the defendants, Huggins and Price, from controlling, directing or
running the railroad in litigation, and from interfering with complainant, Mlarbury, in the discharge of his duty as receiver of said
road; and that Marbury be put in full and complete possession
thereof. The defendants, Huggins and Price, were then in possession. The chancellor granted a preliminary injunction as prayed
for. The master issued an injunction, not only restraining the
defendants as prayed in the bill, but going beyond the fiat and
commanding the sheriff to put the receiver in possession of the
road, and the sheriff execiuted the writ and placed Marbury in
possession as commanded.
Huggins and Price filed answers and moved the chancellor, at
Chambers, to dissolve the injunction, and for an order restoring
them to possession. This motion prevailed, the injunction was
dissolved, and an order made placing Huggins and Price in possession, which was done.
The receiver and the railroad company filed a petition in the
Supreme Court for a supersedeas to the court below to supersede
this last order of the chancellor, to the end that same might be
reversed by the Supreme Court. This petition was filed under see.
3933 of the Code of Tenn., and the decision involved a construction
of this section and the practice under it.
Judge ANDtEWS, delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"The question is, whether, under the authority given us to grant
supersedeas to interlocutory orders and decrees, we may not set
aside orders of the chancellor, granting and dissolving injunctions;
or whether our authority is limited to the staying of proceedings
under decrees which are of a nature to be actively-and affirmatively
enforced against a party." P. 223.
He declares that the power to supersede under this section, only
extended to such interlocutory orders and decrees, as may be enforced actively against a party; and then proceeds to make an
application of the holding to the case before him. To this end he
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discusses the nature and office of injunctions, and says: "An injunction in our practice is a prohibitory writ, and its office is to
restrain, and not to compel, performance. It does not authorize
any act to be done, and there can be no proceeding under it capable
of being stayed by a supersedeas." P. 225. "1So of an order dissolving an injunction. Such an order removes the prohibition imposed by the injunction, but does not itself require or authorize the
doing of an act." Again he says: "Neither under the injunction,
or the order dissolving it, is there any proceeding which can be
stayed." Id.
The language used clearly negatives the idea that we have any
such writ in our practice as a mandatory injunction upon an interlocutory motion. But it is said of the language quoted that it was
unnecessary to the decision of the case, and therefore but the
dictum of the judge who used it. It is true, the order granting
the injunction was not directly involved in the question then before
the court. But the learned judge construes the section involved,
and, in ascertaining the character and nature of an order to dissolve, he, in part, reaches his conclusion from the known .character
and office of the injunction and the order granting it. lie arrives
at the conclusion that the order dissolving must necessarily be negative and passive in its character, because, and for the reason, the
injunction, in our practice, is prohibitory only. I am unable to
say, therefore, with the learned counsel for complainants, that this
is the mere dictum of Judge ANDREWS.
The language quoted has never been questioned by any subsequent decision, so far as I am aware, although the case has been
cited and followed as authority repeatedly since it was decided.
This construction of the statute, sec. 8933, has been frequently
adopted by our court upon the authority of this case. See lfabry
v. .Ross, 1 leisk. 776; Redmond v. Redmond, I Leg. Rep. (Tenn.)
861; 12 Heisk. 506; 1 Lea 78; Id. 396; 8 Id. 465. In the 1
Heiskell case, p. 776, the court uses this language: "The question
came before this court again in the case of McMinnville, &c.,Railroad Co. v. Huggins, 7 Cold. 217. In that case it is held that
this court has not the jurisdiction, under the statute, to set aside a
temporary injunction or an order dissolving guch an injunction.
The reasoning of Mr. Justice ANDREWS in that case is conclusive,
and we may be permitted to commend it as the leading case upon
the interpretation of these statutes."
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In Redmond v. Bedmond, 1 Leg. Rep. (Tenn.) 361, reported also
in 9 Baxter 561, Judge McFARLAND, delivering the unanimous
opinion of our Suprenie Court, on a motion to discharge a supersedeas
granted by one of the judges, superseding an order for an attachment to issue from the chancery court, after citing approvingly the
case from 7 Coldwell 217, said, "but we have no power in this
mode to reverse the action of the inferior court, or to set aside, or
annul, or supersede orders or decrees, which are merely of a vegqative or prohibitory character, or such as have been executed.
We
cannot, therefore, supersede an order granting an injunction, as
this requiresnothing to be done, but is simply prohibitory." Mark
the language of the learned judge. It, certainly is not devoid of
meaning. The italicizing is my own.
I know of no case in our state reports which can be tortured
into a holding different from what is said in the 5 Haywood case,
the 7 Coldwell case, and the 9 Baxter case.
As further support for the position I have just indicated, as to
the practice in this state, I refer to "Hick's Tennessee Manual of
Chancery Practice," p. 267-9, sub-sec. 6. This author is clearly
of opinion that the language of Justice ANDREWS, in the 7th Coldwell case, which he quotes, states the true rule in Tennessee. His
criticism of Lord ELDON'S ruling in Lane v. "_ewdigateis quite
severe, but just.
I must conclude, therefore, that the practice in our state is in
harmony with the holdings of the majority of the American courts
on this question, and tha the application for the. preliminary
injunction should be refused.
This renders any consideration of the other points, discussed by
the learned counsel, unnecessary, and I decline to go into such discussion for the present. The fiat for injunction, on preliminary
motion, is refused.
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Supreme Court of North Carolina.
STEWART ELLISON v. THE CITY OF RALEIGH AND MAYOR AND
ALDERMEN.
A municipal body cannot deprive one of its members of his place for causes,

affecting his eligibility, that existed at the time of his election.
Where, in such case, one is removed, and his successor elected and inducted into
office under a power given to fill vacancies, such successor holds under color of
competent authority, and is a defacto officer; and the removed member being the
adverse claimant, cannot be reinstated by mandamus against the defendants, but

must resort to quo warranto.
APPEAL from a decree refusing a mandamus.
fully stated in the opinion.

The facts are

Messrs. Towle, Argo, Batchelor and 'Clarke, attorneys for the
plaintiffs.
Messrs. Reed, Buzbee &' Buzbee, Puller & Snow and Lewis, for
the defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, C. J.-The plaintiff was duly elected an alderman from
one of the wards into which the city of Raleigh is divided; took
the oath of office before the mayor, and was present with his associate members of the board at three successive meetings of the
body. At the third session, held on May 15th 1883, the plaintiff
'being present and occupying his seat, as he had hitherto done
without objection from any source, a resolution was offered by one
of the aldermen (the transcript of which was not introduced on the
trial), vacating or declaring vacant the plaintiff's seat by reason of
hi§ incompetency in holding an office or place of trust under the
government of the United States at the time of his election and
since. The resolution was put to a vote upon a call for the previous question, and, upon a refusal to hear the plaintiff, was
declared by the casting vote of the presiding officer, the mayor, to
have passed. Nor was the plaintiff's name called in calling the
roll, nor he allowed, though demanding the right, to vote upon
the passage of the resolution. After the plaintiff's ejection the
board proceeded to supply his place by the election of T. J. Bashford, under the provision of the city charter (sec. 20) for filling a
VoL. XXXI.-18
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vacancy, and the plaintiff has since been excluded from acting with
the body to which he had been elected.
This succinct statement .f facts- connected with the expulsion of
the plaintiff, and the admission of said Bashford as his successor,
suffices to present the question whose solution in our view is decisive of the case on appeal.
The proceeding is by mandamus to compel the restoration of the
plaintiff to his office, and against the city of Raleigh and aldermen
by name, except the said Bashford, who is not made a party either
in person or as a member of the board.
Without pausing to animadvert upon the very irregular and summary method adopted to expel a member from his seat without a
hearing, and the suppression of all discussion of the propriety of
the contemplated action of the board, while there can be no serious
doubt of the right of a corporate body to vacat6 the seat of a corporate officer for adequate causes arising subsequent to his taking
his seat, since the case of _ex v. Richardson, decided by Lord
MANSFIELD and followed by numerous others, we lave been unable
to find any precedent for depriving a member of his place by the
action of a municipal body of which he is a member, for any preexisting impediment affecting the capacity to hold the office. On
the other hand, the same eminent judge, in passing upon the sufficiency of a return to a mandamus, says: "It is admitted that they
(the mayor and burgesses of Lynn, the defendants), could not remove for want of an original title ;" and again, "the dueness of
the election is immaterial, for the corporation could not judge of the
title" of the party prosecuting his iight to -he place: King v.'
Lynn, Douglas 85.
So in Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Strang. 819, the court say that a
power of amotion is incident to a corporation according to modern
opinion, and this exercise of inherent corporate authority in the
cases pointed out by Lord MANSFIELD in Rex "v. Lynn, may be
essential to attaining the ends for which the corporation was
formed.
"The power to remove a corporate officer from his office for reasonable and just cause," says Judge DILLON, " is one of the common-law incidents of all corporations: 1 Mun. Corp., sect. 179.
The board of aldermen, thus possessing the power under certain
circumstances to vacate the seat of one of their number (the occasions for doing which, and among them-conduct on his part in
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opposition to his oath and duty as a corporator, are mentioned by
Lord MANSFIELD), have chosen to remove the defendant for the assigned reason of his incompetency under the constitution to occupy
the place, he at the time of his election holding the appointment of
janitor or custodian of the court house of the United States in said
city, and to elect and put another in his place, who has assumed
to act with his associate members and been recognised by them as
the lawful incumbent in all their subsequent official transactions.
His successor, having been thus inducted into the office under color
of competent authority, even though the amotion of the plaintiff
was in excess of the power conferred in the charter, becomes an
officer de facto and his co-operating acts in the body are as effectual
in their relations to others as if he filled the place de jure as well
as de facto. The charter confers authority upon the board to fill
a vacancy when any occurs in their body and they must determine
the existence of the vacancy in order to the exercise of the power
of supplying it.
Can the plaintiff then avail himself of the remedy by writ of
mandamus against the wrongdoers and obtain the ouster of the
present occupant and the restoration of the office to himself without
the presence, in the action, of the alleged usurper ?
In our. opinion the plaintiff misconceives the redress and the
mode of obtaining it provided by law. A mandamus is appropriate when there is no usurpation by. another, and the end sought is
to compel those who ought to admit, and refuse to admit, the person entitled by law to fill the place, to perform their duty in this
behalf; and the writ may be granted, says Mr. Willcock, "when
quo warranto does not lie, although the office be already full, as
otherwise, in many cases, the applicant would be without remedy. '
Dill. Mun. Corp., sec. 678.
Mandamus may be sought to compel the city counsel to admit a
councilman duly elected to that office: State v. Rahway, 33 N. J.
L. l1l, cited by Dillon in sec. 679. But as this writer remarks
in the next section, 680, "the adjudged cases in this country
agree that quo warranto, or an information or proceeding in the
nature of a quo, warranto, is the appropriate remedy when not
changed by charter or statute for an usurpation of a municipal
franchise, as well as for unauthorized usurpations and intrusions into
municipal offices ;" and the author proceeds : "If another is commissioned and in actual discharge of the duties of the office, an
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adverse claimant to the office is not entitled to a mandamus, but
must resort to quo warranto." The wrongful occupant must, however, have entered under color of authority and not be a mere
usurper in the restricted sense of that term, to put the rightful
claimant to the necessity of a resort to this remedy.
In this state the writ of quo warranto and proceedings by
information in the nature of quo warranto are abolished, and the
remedies which these forms formerly furnished can be obtained
under special provisions made by statute: C. C. P. sec. 362, a
substantial re-enactment of 9 Anne.
It is expressly declared in section 866 that an action may be
brought by the attorney-general upon his own information or on
the complaint of any private party against offenders, "when any
person shall usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any
public office, civil or military, or any franchise withii this state,
or any office in a corporation created by the authority of this
state."
The statute provides thus, and in suibsequent sections, for the fullest relief to the rightful claimants against an unlawful intrusion,
and thereby dispenses with the need of recourse to other process,
unless those required to induct still refuse to do so after the amotion
of the intruder by the judgment of the court; and then they may
be compelled to proceed in the discharge of their duties. As the
statutory remedy is ample, so where it can be had and made
effectual it is the only mode of deciding the conflicting claims to
office by an adjudication between the contesting parties.
In Howerton v. Tate, 66 N. C. 231, this court remarked that,
"supposing the writ of mandamus to be the proper remedy, wich
we do not concede (C.C. P. sees. 366 and 867), the proceeding
was not properly instituted."
The doubt intimated is resolved in the subsequent case of Brown
v. Turner, 70 N. 0. 93, wherein after an elaborate discussion the
court, BYNumx, J., delivering the opinion, thus speaks: "Is the
plaintiff prosecuting his claim by the right form of action? Mandamus is a proceeding to compel a defendant to perform a duty
which is owing to the plaintiff, and can be maintained only on the
ground that the relator has a present clear legal right to the thing
claimed, and that it is the duty of the defendant to render it to
him. If it appears from the complaint that two persons are
claiming the same duty adversely to each other against a third party
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the writ does not lie; Tom. Law Dict. Mandamus; 3 Burr. 1452;
and that for the plain reason that the title must be decided between
them before the defendant can know to whom the duty or thing is
due." * * * " The question of title is put directly in issue, and
when that is the case mandamus is not the form of action; but
the appropriate remedy is an action in the nature of quo warranto,
not against Howerton but, against Turner."
The title here is in dispute so as to induce us to refrain from
ordering any specific action to be performed by the board until
the controversy is settled and the right determined by a direct
adjudication. But if there were no other objection to the present
form of proceeding, an insuperable obstacle is presented in the
fact, that the court is called on to pass upon the rights of one
who is not a party to it. This is indispensable to his being affected
by the result.
In support of a qualified recognition of the right officer to be
reinstated through the command of the court, in section 67, High
on Legal Rem., reference is made, in an appended, note to several
decisions which we have looked into and find but one (Drew v.
Jucqes, c., 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 1), fully sustaining the text. In
a return to the rule to show cause why a mandamus should not
issue .to the defendants to admit the plaintiff to the office of clerk
of the said district court, whereof the defendants were judges, it
appeared that the plaintiff produced on the first day of the session the evidence of his appointment, and his taking the prescribed
oath, but did not tender a sufficient bond as required by law. The
court thereupon appointed another in his stead, who at once proceeded in the discharge of his official duties. Four days thereafter
the plaintiff offered a sufficient bond and was refused admittance
to the office. The mandamus was then asked, and the rule to show
cause ordered to issue. It was held that the plaintiff was not
required to qualify on the opening of the court, and was in time in
making his application afterwards according to the statute. In
answer to the objection that the incumbent ought to have been
served with notice of the pending motion, TUCKER, J., says: "It
was properly answered that the return shows he had notice,
being attested by him, and the record shows he did appear in the
general court as a party, and consented to the award of a commission to take depositions." This decision may find support in
the exceptional features of the case, the office being under the
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direct control of the court, so that full relief could be administered
with a due regard to the rights of both contestants. The maandamus
is held a proper remedy in the case, among other reasons, because
the right to proceed by a quo warranto information is not guarafiteed to every citizen, and can only be prosecuted by leave of the
attorney-general. But our statute (see. 366 of C. C. P.), bearing
the title, "Action upon information or complaint of course," seems to
contemplate the action as one open upon the complaint of any private
party, and if its institution as a remedy for a violated civil right is
left to the discretion of the attorney-general (and we are not ready
to concede an arbitrary discretion in the matter), we must assume
that in every proper case his consent on proper terms will be
given.
This was the method of procedure adopted in Cloud v. Wilson,
72 N. C. 155, where the defendant entered into the office of judge
by virtue of an election authorized by an act of the legislature to
fill
an unexpired term, and it was sustained, although the statute
was in violation of the constitution, and all done under its sanction
was absolutely null. The controversy was between an officer de
jure and one de facto, and this was recognised as the legal method
of determining it.
We do not propose to inquire whether the office or place held
by the plaintiff at the time of the election and since, is an "office
or place of trust or profit," within the meaning of the constitutional
amendment of 1875, which is but the restoration of a clause contained
in the amendments made in the Constitution of 1835 and omitted
in that of 1868, for it is no easy task to run the discriminating line
which separates such offices and places from employments in the
public service which are not embraced in those terms. Nor will
we consider how far the court should go in reinstating in office,
one improperly removed but who may appear disabled and forbidden
by law to possess it and exercise its attached privileges and rights
in the opinion of the court. It is enough for us to see that the
right to the office is drawn in question, and that one who entered
in the form of law and is in the possession of the place discharging
its duties, is to be affected by the decision without having an opportunity to be heard.
It is certainly inadmissible to command the defendants to receive
the plaintiffs into their body without at the same time removing
their appointee, for the ward cannot have a representation in excess

